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Guarantees on learning depth-2 neural networks
under a data-poisoning attack
Anirbit Mukherjee∗, Ramchandran Muthukumar†,
Abstract
In recent times many state-of-the-art machine learning models have been shown to be fragile to adversarial
attacks. In this work we attempt to build our theoretical understanding of adversarially robust learning with neural
nets. We demonstrate a specific class of neural networks of finite size and a non-gradient stochastic algorithm which
tries to recover the weights of the net generating the realizable true labels in the presence of an oracle doing a
bounded amount of malicious additive distortion to the labels. We prove (nearly optimal) trade-offs among the
magnitude of the adversarial attack, the accuracy and the confidence achieved by the proposed algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
The seminal paper [35] was among the first to highlight a key vulnerability of state-of-the-art network architec-
tures like GoogLeNet, that adding small imperceptible adversarial noise to test data can dramatically impact the
performance of the network. In these cases despite the vulnerability of the predictive models to the distorted input,
human observers are still able to correctly classify this adversarially corrupted data. In the last few years adversarial
attack experiments of the above kind have been improved upon and replicated on several state-of-the-art neural
network implementations [13], [27], [3], [14]. This phenomena has also resulted in new adversarial defences being
proposed to counter the attacks. Such empirical observations have been systematically reviewed in [1], [28]
Here we quickly review the conventional mathematical setup of adversarial risk that is typically used to quantify the
robust performance of predictors. Suppose Z is the measure space where the data lives, H is the hypothesis space
where the predictor is being searched and suppose the loss function is mapping, ℓ : H×Z → R+. Then an adversar-
ial attack is a set map A : Z → 2Z . If D is the data distribution/probability measure on Z then given an adversarial
attack A, the adversarial risk of a hypothesis h ∈ H is defined as, R(h;D, ℓ,A) := Ez∼D
[
supz˜∈A(z) ℓ(h, z˜)
]
The adversarial learning task is to find h∗ ∈ argminh∈HR(h;D, ℓ,A). Any hypothesis h with low adversarial risk
will be stable to attacks of type A on the test data. This optimization formulation of adversarial robustness has
been extensively explored in recent years. : multiple attack strategies have been systematically catalogued in [7],
[22], [33], computational hardness of finding an adversarial risk minimizing hypothesis has been analyzed in [4],
[6], [32], [24], the issue of certifying adversarial robustness of a given predictor has been analyzed in [29], [30]
and bounds on the Rademacher complexity of adversarial risk have been explored in [40], [17].
In contrast we are aware of only one attempt at provable training of a neural network in the above model of
adversarial risk, [10]. This result as it stands only applies when the net is asymptotically large/in the NTK regime.
The authors here were able to establish that (deterministic) gradient descent can minimize the adversarial empirical
risk on asymptotically large networks.
Thus it still remains an open challenge to demonstrate an example of provably robust training when (a) the neural
network is realistically large/finite and (b) the algorithm has the common structure of being iterative and stochastic
in nature. In this work we take a few steps towards this goal by working in a framework inspired by the causative
attack model [34], [2]. The learning task in this attack model is framed as a game between a defender who seeks to
learn and an attacker who aims to prevent this. In a typical scenario the defender draws a finite number of samples
from the true distribution (say Sc) and for some ǫ ∈ (0, 1) the attacker mixes into the training data a set Sp of
(maybe adaptively) corrupted training samples such that |Sp| = ǫ|Sc|. Now the defender has to train on the set
∗ Department of Applied Mathematics and Statistics, Johns Hopkins University, Email: amukhe14@jhu.edu
† Department of Computer Science, Johns Hopkins Univeristy, Email: rmuthuk1@jhu.edu
1Sp∪Sc. We note that our model differs from this causative attack model because we allow for any arbitrary fraction
(including all) of the training data to be corrupted by the specific kind of adversarial attack that we allow. Also
our adversary corrupts the training data in an online fashion - what is sometimes also called the data-poisoning
attack [36], [41], [19].
We also note that we consider the case of regression on nets as opposed to the more frequently done empirical
studies on adversarially robust classification by neural nets. To the best of our knowledge previous work on robust
regression have been limited to linear functions and have either considered corruptions that are limited to a small
subset [15], [37] of the input space/feature predictors or make structural assumptions on the corruption. Despite
the substantial progress with understanding robust linear regression [38], [39], [8], [5], [23], [21], [20], [25], the
corresponding questions have remained open for even simple neural networks.
Our first key step is to make a careful choice of the neural network class to work with, as given in Definition 1.
Secondly, for the optimization algorithm, we draw inspiration from the different versions of the iterative stochastic
non-gradient Tron algorithms analyzed in the past, [31], [26], [9], [16], [18], [11], [12]. We generalize this class
of algorithms to a form as given in Algorithm 1 and we run it in the presence of an adversarial oracle that we
instantiate which is free to make any additive perturbation (within a constant norm constraint) to the true output
generated by a network of the same architecture as the one being trained on. Beyond boundedness, we impose no
other distributional constraint on how the adversary additively distorts the true label.
In our main result, theorem II.1 we show that against the above adversary this algorithm while trying to recover
the original net’s parameters, achieves a certain trade off between accuracy, confidence and the maximum allowed
perturbation that the adversary is allowed to make. Further in section II-A we will explain that this trade-off is
nearly optimal in the worst-case.
A. The Mathematical Setup
As alluded to earlier we move away from the adversarial risk framework. We work in the supervised learning
framework where we observe (input,output) data pairs z = (x, y) ∈ Z := X × Y where X and Y are measure
spaces. Let D be the distribution over the measure space Z and let Din be the marginal distribution over the input
space X . If H is the hypothesis space for our learning task then let ℓ : H × Z → R+ be a loss function. We
model an adversarial oracle as a map OA : Z 7→ Z , that corrupts the data z ∈ Z with the intention of making the
learning task harder. The learner observes only the corrupted data zadv := OA(z) where z ∼ D and aims to find a
hypothesis h ∈ H that minimizes the true risk, R(h;D) = Ez∼D [ℓ(h, z)]
In this work, we specifically consider the instance when X = Rn, Y = R, l is the square loss function and the
hypothesis space H := Fk,α,A,W , the class of depth-2, width-k neural networks defined as follows,
Definition 1 (Single Filter Neural Nets of Depth-2 and Width-k). Given a set of k sensing matrices A = {Ai ∈
R
r×n | i = 1, . . . , k}, an α-leaky ReLU activation mapping, R ∋ y 7→ σ(y) = y1y≥0 + αy1y<0 ∈ R and a filter
space W ⊆ Rr we define the function class Fk,α,A,W as,
Fk,α,A,W =
{
fw : R
n ∋ x 7→ 1
k
k∑
i=1
σ
(
w⊤Aix
)
∈ R | w ∈ W
}
Note that the above class of neural networks encompasses the following common instances, (a) single ReLU gates
as F1,0,{In×n},Rn and (b) Depth-2, Width-k Convolutional Neural Nets when the sensing matrices Ai are such
that each have exactly one 1 in each row and at most one 1 in each column and rest entries being zero.
2Optimization with an Adversarial Oracle: We assume that ∃ w∗ ∈ Rr such that the adversarial oracle acts as,
R
n ∋ x 7→ OA(x) = fw∗(x) + ξx ∈ R while |ξx| ≤ θ for some fixed θ and our risk minimization optimization
problem can be be stated as : argminw∈W Ex∼Din
[
(fw∗(x)− fw(x))2
]
where ∀x ∈ Rn one only has access to
OA(x) as defined above. Towards being able to solve the described optimization problem we make the following
assumptions about the data distribution Din,
Assumptions 1.1 : Parity Symmetry
We assume that the input distribution Din is symmetric under the parity transformation i.e if x is a random
variable such that x ∼ Din then we would also have −x ∼ Din.
Assumptions 1.2 : Finiteness of certain expectations
The following expectations under x ∼ Din are are assumed to be finite,
Ex
[
‖x‖
]
=: m1, Ex
[
‖x‖2
]
=: m2, Ex
[
‖x‖3
]
=: m3, Ex
[
‖x‖4
]
=: m4
Note that in the above the adversarial oracle is free to design ξx however cleverly (maybe even as a function of
all the data seen so far and fw∗) while obeying the norm bound. For ease of notation we define, A¯ :=
1
k
∑k
i=1Ai,
Σ := E[xx⊤] and,
λ1 := λmin(A¯ΣM
T ), λ2 :=
√
λmax(MTM), λ3 :=
1
k
k∑
i=1
λmax(AiA
⊤
i ).
We now state a stochastic non-gradient algorithm, Neuro-Tron inspired by [16],[18],[12],
Algorithm 1 Neuro-Tron (multi-gate, single filter, stochastic)
Input: Sampling access to the marginal input distribution Din on Rn.
Input: Access to adversarially corrupted output y ∈ R when queried with x ∈ Rn
Input: Access to the output of any fw ∈ Fk,α,A,W for any w and input.
Input: A sensing matrix M ∈ Rr×n and an arbitrarily chosen starting point of w1 ∈ Rr
for t = 1, . . . do
Sample x(t) ∼ Din and query the (adversarial) oracle with it.
The oracle replies back with y(t) = fw∗(x
(t)) + ξ(t)
Form the Tron-gradient,
g(t) := M
((
y(t) − fw(t)(x(t))
)
x(t)
)
w(t+1) := w(t) + ηg(t)
end for
II. THE MAIN RESULT
Theorem II.1. Suppose that Assumptions 1.1 &1.2 are satisfied and λ1 > 0.
Case I : Realizable and no noise, θ = 0.
Suppose the oracle returns faithful output i.e it sends y = fw∗(x) when queried with x.
Then if we choose step size η in Algorithm 1 as,
η =
1
γ
· λ1
(1 + α)λ22λ3m4
, where γ > max
{ λ21
λ22λ3m4
, 1
}
3for all desired accuracy parameter ǫ ≥ 0 and failure probability δ ≥ 0, for T = O
(
log
(‖w(1)−w∗‖2
ǫ2δ
))
we have
that,
‖w(T) −w∗‖ ≤ ǫ w.p. atleast (1− δ)
Case II : Realizable with bounded adversarial corruption on labels, 0 < θ < θ∗.
Suppose that when queried with x, the oracle returns an adversarially corrupted output y = OA(x) = fw∗(x)+ ξx
where |ξx| ≤ θ. Define ctrade−off = −1 + (1+α)λ1m1λ2 . Suppose the distribution Din, matrix M in Algorithm 1, noise
bound θ∗, target accuracy ǫ and target confidence δ > 0 are such that,
θ∗2 = ǫ2δ · ctrade−off and ǫ2δ < ‖w(1) −w∗‖2 (1)
Then if we choose step size η in Algorithm 1 as,
η =
1
γ
· m1ctrade−off
(1 + α)2λ2λ3
(
m4 +m3
) where γ > max

 (m1ctrade−off )
2
(1 + α)2λ3(m3 +m4)
,
(
ǫ2δ + θ
2(m2+m3)
(1+α)2λ3(m3+m4)
ǫ2δ − θ2ctrade−off
)
 > 1
Then for,
T = O
(
log
[
‖w(1) −w∗‖2
ǫ2δ − θ2crate
])
, where crate =
γ − 1
m2+m3
(1+α)2λ3(m3+m4)
+ γctrade−off
we have,
‖w(T) −w∗‖ ≤ ǫ w.p. atleast (1− δ)
Remark. (a) If r ≤ n and A¯Σ is full rank i.e rank r then in the above we can always chosen M = A¯Σ Also if
Σ is PD then M = A¯ is also a valid choice. (b) It can be easily seen that the term occurring in the expression of
T above, “ǫ2δ − θ2crate ” is positive because of the lowerbound imposed on the parameter γ (c) The above theorem
essentially gives a worst-case trade-off between ǫ (the accuracy ) and δ (the confidence) that can be achieved when
training against a fixed adversary additively corrupting the true output generated by the network by at most θ∗. In
subsection II-A we will show that this worst-case trade-off is nearly optimal.
To develop some feel for the constraint imposed by equation 1 in the main theorem we look at a situation where
the input data is being sampled from the normal distribution and the true output is computed by F1,0,{In×n},Rn , a
single ReLU gate neural network.
Lemma II.2. (Provable training for Gaussian distributions and single-ReLU gate with an adversarial oracle).
Suppose Din = N (0, σ2In×n) and H = F1,0,{In×n},Rn . For the choice of M = In×n in Algorithm 1, the constraint
in theorem II.1 can be written as,
θ∗2
ǫ2δ
=
σ√
2
·
[
Γ
(
n
2
)
Γ
(
n+1
2
)
]
− 1. (2)
Proof: Here λ1 = σ
2, λ2 = λ3 = 1 and α = 0. We invoke standard results about the Gaussian distribution to see,
Ex∼N (0,σ2I)
[
‖x‖k
]
= Ex∼N (0,I)
[
‖σx‖k
]
= σkEx∼N (0,I)
[
‖x‖k
]
= σk2k/2
Γ
(
n+k
2
)
Γ
(
n
2
) .
Therefore, m1 = Ex∼N (0,σ2In×n)
[
‖x‖
]
= σ
√
2 ·
Γ
(
n+1
2
)
Γ
(
n
2
) . Thus the condition obtained in theorem II.1 results in
equation 2.
4Hence we conclude that if we want to defend against an adversary with a fixed corruption budget of θ∗ with a
desired accuracy of ǫ and failure probability of δ then a sufficient condition (a safe data distribution) is if the data
distribution is N (0, σ2I) with σ2 being an increasing function of the data dimension n in an appropriate way s.t
the the RHS of equation 2 remains fixed.
A. Demonstrating The Near Optimality Of The Guarantees Of Theorem II.1
We recall that Case I of theorem II.1 shows that Algorithm 1 recovers the true filter w∗ when it has access to
clean/exactly realizable data. For a given true filter w∗ ∈ Rr consider another value for the filter Rr ∋ wadv 6= w∗
and suppose that θ∗ = β for some β ≥ supx∈supp(Din) |fwadv(x) − fw∗(x)|. It is easy to imagine cases where the
supremum in the RHS exists like when Din is compactly supported. Now in this situation equation 1 says that
ǫ2 = θ
⋆2
δctrade−off
=⇒ ǫ2 ≥ β2ctrade−off , Hence proving optimality of the guarantee is equivalent to showing the existence
of an attack within this β bound for which the best accuracy possible nearly saturates this lowerbound.
Now note that this choice of θ∗ allows for the adversarial oracle OA to be such that when queried at x it replies
back with ξx + fw∗(x) where ξx = fwadv(x)− fw∗(x). Hence the data the algorithm receives will be such that it
can be exactly realized with the filter choice being wadv. Hence the realizable case analysis of theorem II.1 will
apply showing that the algorithm’s iterates are converging in high probability to wadv. Hence the error incurred is
such that ǫ ≥ ‖wadv −w∗‖.
Now consider an instantiation of the above attack happening with β = r‖wadv −w∗‖ for r = supx∈supp(Din)‖x‖
and f being a single ReLU gate i.e Rn ∋ x 7→ fw∗(x) = ReLU(w⊤∗ x) ∈ R. Its easy to imagine cases where Din
is such that r is finite and it also satisfies Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2. Further, this choice of β is valid since the
following holds,
sup
x∈supp(Din)
|fwadv(x)− fw∗(x)| = sup
x∈supp(Din)
|ReLU(w⊤advx)− ReLU(w⊤∗ x)|
≤ r‖wadv −w∗‖ = β
Thus the above setup invoked on training a ReLU gate with inputs being sampled from Din as above while the
labels are being additively corrupted by at most β = r‖wadv − w∗‖ demonstrates a case where the worst case
accuracy guarantee of ǫ2 ≥ β2ctrade−off is optimal upto a constant r
2
ctrade−off
. We note that this argument also implies
the near optimality of equation 1 for any algorithm defending against this attack which also has the property of
recovering the parameters correctly when the labels are exactly realizable.
III. ANALYZING TRON DYNAMICS (PROOF OF THEOREM II.1)
Proof: Let the training data sampled till the iteration t be St = {(x1,y1), . . . , (xt,y(t))} We shall overload the
notation to also denote by St the sigma algebra generated by the first t samples. We recall that the weight vector
update at iteration t is w(t+1) = w(t) + ηg(t) and this gives us,
E
[
‖w(t+1) −w∗‖2
]
= E
[
‖w(t) + ηg(t) −w∗‖2
]
= E
[
‖w(t) −w∗‖2 + η2‖g(t)‖2 + 2η〈w(t) −w∗,g(t)〉
]
(3)
Conditioned on St−1, w(t) is determined while w(t+1) and g(t) are random and dependent on the random choice
of (x(t), ξ(t)). Now we compute the following conditional expectation,
5E
[
2η〈w(t) −w∗,g(t)〉
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
= 2ηE
[(
fw∗(x
(t)) + ξ(t) − fw(t)(x(t))
)
(w(t) −w∗)⊤Mx(t)
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
= 2ηE
[(
fw∗(x
(t))− fw(t)(x(t))
)
· (w(t) −w∗)⊤Mx(t)
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
+ 2ηE
[
ξ(t)(w(t) −w∗)⊤Mx(t)
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
≤ −2η
k
k∑
i=1
E
[(
σ(w(t)
⊤
Aix
(t))− σ(w∗⊤Aix(t))
)
(w(t) −w∗)⊤Mx(t)
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
+ 2ηE
[
|ξ(t)| · |(w(t) −w∗)⊤Mx(t)|
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
In the first term above we can remove the activation σ(·) by recalling an identity proven in [12] which we have
reproduced here as lemma B.1 here. Thus we get,
E
[
2η〈w(t) −w∗,g(t)〉
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
≤ −η(1 + α)
k
k∑
i=1
E
[
(w(t) −w∗)⊤Aix(t)(w(t) −w∗)⊤Mx(t)
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
+ 2ηθ‖w(t) −w∗‖ · E
[
‖Mx(t)‖
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
≤ −η(1 + α)(w(t) −w∗)⊤ A¯ E
[
x(t)x(t)⊤
∣∣∣∣St−1]M⊤ (w(t) −w∗) + 2ηθ‖w(t) −w∗‖
√
λmax(M⊤M) · E
[
‖x(t)‖
∣∣∣∣St−1]
≤ −η(1 + α) · λmin
(
A¯E
[
x(t)x(t)⊤
∣∣∣∣St−1]M⊤
)
· ‖w(t) −w∗‖2 + 2ηθ · E
[
‖x(t)‖
∣∣∣∣St−1] ·
√
λmax(MTM)‖w(t) −w∗‖
≤ −η(1 + α) · λmin
(
A¯E
[
x(t)x(t)⊤
∣∣∣∣St−1]M⊤
)
· ‖w(t) −w∗‖2 + 2ηθλ2 · E
[
‖x(t)‖
∣∣∣∣St−1] · ‖w(t) −w∗‖ (4)
In the above steps we have invoked the definition of A¯ that we had defined earlier. Now we bound the second term
in the RHS of equation 3 as follows,
E
[
‖ηg(t)‖2
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
= η2E
[
(y(t) − fw(t)(x(t)))2 · ‖Mx(t)‖2
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
≤ η2λ22 · E
[(
fw∗(x
(t)) + ξ(t) − fw(t)(x(t))
)2 · ‖x(t)‖2∣∣∣∣St−1
]
≤ η2λ22 · E
[((
fw∗(x
(t))− fw(t)(x(t))
)2
+ 2ξ(t)
(
fw∗(x
(t))− fw(t)(x(t))
)
+ (ξ(t))2
)
· ‖x(t)‖2
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
≤ η2λ22c2E
[
‖x(t)‖4
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
· ‖w(t) −w∗‖2 + 2η2λ22θ · c · E
[
‖x(t)‖3
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
· ‖w(t) −w∗‖+ η2λ22θ2E
[
‖x(t)‖2
∣∣∣∣St−1
]
(5)
In the above lines we have invoked lemma B.2 twice to upperbound the term, |(fw∗(x(t))− fw(t)(x(t)))| and we
have defined, c2 := (1 + α)2λ3 =
(1+α)2
k
(∑k
i=1 λmax(AiA
⊤
i )
)
. Now we take total expectations of both sides of
equations 4 and 5 recalling that the conditional expectation of functions of x(t) w.r.t St−1 are random variables
6which are independent of the powers of ‖w(t) −w∗‖. Then we substitute the resulting expressions into the RHS
of equation 3 invoking the definitions of m1,m2,m3,m4 and λ1 to get,
E
[
‖w(t+1) −w∗‖2
]
≤
[
1 + η2λ22c
2 ·m4 − ηλ1(1 + α)
]
· E
[
‖wt −w∗‖2
]
+
[
2η2λ22c ·m3θ + 2ηλ2 ·m1θ
]
· E
[
‖w(t) −w∗‖
]
+ η2λ22 ·m2θ2. (6)
Case I : Realizable, θ = 0.
Here the recursion above simplifies to,
E
[
‖w(t+1) −w∗‖2
]
≤
[
1 + η2λ22c
2 ·m4 − ηλ1(1 + α)
]
· E
[
‖wt −w∗‖2
]
(7)
Let κ = 1 + η2λ22c
2 ·m4 − ηλ1(1 + α). Thus, for all t ∈ Z+,
E
[
‖w(t) −w∗‖2
]
≤ κt−1E
[
‖w(1) −w∗‖2
]
Recalling that c2 = (1 +α)λ3, we can verify that the choice of step size given the theorem is η =
1
γ · λ1(1+α)λ22c2m4 and
the assumption on γ ensures that for this η, κ = 1− γ−1γ2 λ
2
1
λ22λ3m4
∈ (0, 1). Therefore, for T = O
(
log
(‖w(1)−w∗‖
ǫ2δ
))
,
we have
E
[
‖w(T) −w∗‖2
]
≤ ǫ2δ
The conclusion now follows from Markov’s inequality.
Case II : Realizable + Adversarial Noise, 0 < θ < θ∗.
Note that the linear term ‖w(t) −w∗‖ in equation 6 is an unique complication that is introduced here because of
the absence of distributional assumptions on the noise in the labels. We can now upperbound the linear term using
the AM-GM inequality as follows, which also helps decouple the adversarial noise terms from the distance to the
optima,
E
[[
2η2λ22c ·m3θ + 2ηλ2 ·m1θ
]
· ‖w(t) −w∗‖
]
= E
[
η2λ22m3 · 2 · θ ·
(
c‖w(t) −w∗‖
)
+ ηλ2m1 · 2 · θ ·
(
‖w(t) −w∗‖
)]
≤ E
[
η2λ22m3
[
θ2 + c2‖w(t) −w∗‖2
]
+ ηλ2m1
[
θ2 + ‖w(t) −w∗‖2
]]
.
Thus equation 6 becomes,
E
[
‖w(t+1) −w∗‖2
]
≤
[
η2λ22c
2(m4 +m3)− ηλ2
(
λ1(1 + α)
λ2
−m1
)
+ 1
]
E
[
‖wt −w∗‖2
]
+ θ2
(
η2λ22(m2 +m3) + ηλ2m1
)
7Let us define ∆t = E
[
‖w(t) −w∗‖2
]
, η′ := ηλ2, b :=
λ1(1+α)
λ2
−m1, c1 = c2(m4 +m3), c2 := θ2 · (m2 +m3) and
c3 = θ
2 ·m1. Then the dynamics of the algorithm is given by,
∆t+1 ≤ (1− η′b+ η′2c1)∆t + η′2c2 + η′c3
We note that the above is of the same form as lemma A.1 in the Appendix with ∆1 = ‖w1 −w∗‖2. We invoke
the lemma with ǫ′2 := ǫ2δ s.t equation 1 holds. This along with the bound on noise that θ ∈ (0, θ∗) ensures that,
c3
b =
θ2
ctrade−off
= θ
2
θ∗2 · ǫ2δ < ǫ2δ < ∆1 as required by lemma A.1. The chosen value of η in the theorem follows
from the sufficient condition specified for η′ in the lemma A.1.
Recalling the definition of crate as given in the theorem statement we can see that
c2
c1
+γ· c3
b
γ−1 =
θ2
crate
and hence we
can read off from lemma A.1 that at the value of T as specified in the theorem statement we have from lemma
A.1 that,
∆T = E
[
‖wT −w∗‖2
]
≤ ǫ2δ
and the needed high probability guarantee follows by Markov inequality.
IV. CONCLUSION
To the best of our knowledge in this paper we have provided the first demonstration of a class of provably robustly
learnable finitely large neural networks i.e along with the neural network class, we have given a class of adversarial
oracles supplying additively corrupted labels and a corresponding stochastic algorithm which upto a certain accuracy
and confidence performs supervised learning on our network in the presence of this malicious oracle corrupting the
realizable true labels. We have also established as to why our guarantees are nearly optimal.
There are a number of exciting open questions that now open up from here. Firstly it remains to broaden the
scope of such proofs to more complicated neural networks and to more creative adversaries which can say do
more difficult distortions to the labels or corrupt even the samples from the data distribution Din. It will also be
interesting to be able to characterize the information theoretic limits of accuracy and confidence trade-offs as a
function of the corruption budget of the adversary, even while staying within the setup of theorem II.1
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APPENDIX A
ESTIMATING A CERTAIN RECURSION
Lemma A.1. Suppose we have a sequence of real numbers ∆1,∆2, . . . s.t
∆t+1 ≤ (1− η′b+ η′2c1)∆t + η′2c2 + η′c3
for some fixed parameters b, c1, c2, c3 > 0 s.t ∆1 >
c3
b and free parameter η
′ > 0. Then for,
ǫ′2 ∈
(c3
b
,∆1
)
, η′ =
b
γc1
, γ > max
{
b2
c1
,
(
ǫ′2 + c2c1
ǫ′2 − c3b
)}
> 1
it follows that ∆T ≤ ǫ′2 for,
T = O
(
log
[
∆1
ǫ′2 −
( c2
c1
+γ· c3
b
γ−1
)
])
Proof: Let us define α = 1− η′b+ η′2c1 and β = η′2c2 + η′c3. Then by unrolling the recursion we get,
∆t ≤ α∆t−1 + β ≤ α(α∆t−2 + β) + β ≤ ... ≤ αt−1∆1 + β(1 + α+ . . .+ αt−2).
Now suppose that the following are true for ǫ′ as given and for α & β (evaluated for the range of η′s as specified
in the theorem),
Claim 1 : α ∈ (0, 1)
Claim 2 : 0 < ǫ′2(1− α) − β
We will soon show that the above claims are true. Now if T is s.t we have,
αT−1∆1 + β(1 + α+ . . .+ αT−2) = αT−1∆1 + β · 1− α
T−1
1− α = ǫ
′2
then αT−1 = ǫ
′2(1−α)−β
∆1(1−α)−β . Note that Claim 2 along with with the assumption that ǫ
′2 < ∆1 ensures that the
numerator and the denominator of the fraction in the RHS are both positive. Thus we can solve for T as follows,
=⇒ (T− 1) log
(
1
α
)
= log
[
∆1(1− α)− β
ǫ′2(1− α)− β
]
=⇒ T = O
(
log
[
∆1
ǫ′2 −
( c2
c1
+γ· c3
b
γ−1
)
])
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In the second equality above we have estimated the expression for T after substituting η′ = bγc1 in the expressions
for α and β.
Proof of claim 1 : α ∈ (0, 1)
We recall that we have set η′ = bγc1 . This implies that, α = 1 − b
2
c1
·
(
1
γ − 1γ2
)
. Hence α > 0 is ensured by the
assumption that γ > b
2
c1
. And α < 1 is ensured by the assumption that γ > 1
Proof of claim 2 : 0 < ǫ′2(1− α)− β
We note the following,
− 1
ǫ′2
· (ǫ′2(1− α)− β) = α− (1− β
ǫ′2
)
= 1− b
2
4c1
+
(
η′
√
c1 − b
2
√
c1
)2
−
(
1− β
ǫ′2
)
=
η′2c2 + η′c3
ǫ′2
+
(
η′
√
c1 − b
2
√
c1
)2
− b
2
4c1
=
(
η′
√
c2 +
c3
2
√
c2
)2
− c234c2
ǫ′2
+
(
η′
√
c1 − b
2
√
c1
)2
− b
2
4c1
= η′2
(
1
ǫ′2
·
(√
c2 +
c3
2η′
√
c2
)2
+
(√
c1 − b
2η′
√
c1
)2 − 1
η′2
[
b2
4c1
+
1
ǫ′2
(
c23
4c2
)])
Now we substitute η′ = bγc1 for the quantities in the expressions inside the parantheses to get,
− 1
ǫ′2
· (ǫ′2(1− α)− β) = α− (1− β
ǫ′2
)
= η′2
(
1
ǫ′2
·
(√
c2 +
γc1c3
2b
√
c2
)2
+ c1 ·
(γ
2
− 1
)2
− c1γ
2
4
− 1
ǫ′2
· γ
2c21c
2
3
4b2c2
)
= η′2
(
1
ǫ′2
·
(√
c2 +
γc1c3
2b
√
c2
)2
+ c1(1− γ)− 1
ǫ′2
· γ
2c21c
2
3
4b2c2
)
=
η′2
ǫ′2
(
c2 +
γc1c3
b
− ǫ′2c1(γ − 1)
)
=
η′2c1
ǫ′2
(
(ǫ′2 +
c2
c1
)− γ ·
(
ǫ′2 − c3
b
))
Therefore, − 1ǫ′2
(
ǫ′2(1− α)− β) < 0 since by assumption ǫ′2 > c3b , and γ >
(
ǫ′2+
c2
c1
)
ǫ′2− c3
b
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APPENDIX B
LEMMAS FOR THEOREM II.1
Lemma B.1 (Lemma 1, [12]). If D is parity symmetric distribution on Rn and σ is an α−Leaky ReLU then
∀ a,b ∈ Rn,
Ex∼D
[
σ(a⊤x)b⊤x
]
=
1 + α
2
Ex∼D
[
(a⊤x)(b⊤x)
]
Lemma B.2.
(fw∗(x)− fw(x))2 ≤ (1 + α)2
(1
k
k∑
i=1
λmax(AiA
⊤
i )
)
‖w∗ −w‖2‖x‖2
Proof:
(
fw∗(x)− fw(x)
)2
≤
(1
k
k∑
i=1
σ
(〈
A⊤i w∗,x
〉)
− 1
k
k∑
i=1
σ
(〈
A⊤i w,x
〉))2
≤ 1
k
k∑
i=1
(
σ
(〈
A⊤i w∗,x
〉)
− σ
(〈
A⊤i w,x
〉))2
≤ (1 + α)
2
k
k∑
i=1
〈
A⊤i w∗ − A⊤i w,x
〉2
=
(1 + α)2
k
k∑
i=1
(
(w∗ −w)⊤Aix
)2
=
(1 + α)2
k
k∑
i=1
‖w∗ −w‖2‖Aix‖2 ≤ (1 + α)
2
k
k∑
i=1
‖w∗ −w‖2λmax(AiA⊤i )‖x‖2
≤ (1 + α)
2
k
( k∑
i=1
λmax(AiA
⊤
i )
)
‖w∗ −w‖2‖x‖2
